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Abstract
The Nord Stream 2 pipeline proposes to connect Germany to the world’s largest natural gas reserves in
Russia, allowing the state-owned Russian energy behemoth Gazprom to double its export capacity
through the ‘Northern Corridor’ transit route to Europe. This project has been the subject of sharp
disapproval from Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the United States, which fear the
prospect of increasing dependence on gas imports from a Russia perceived as politically aggressive and
unreliable. This paper will identify the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications involved in the
construction of Nord Stream 2 by adopting a geostrategic worldview of the competition over the
lucrative EU energy market. The conclusions reached in this paper encourage the European Union to
forge ahead in constructing Nord Stream 2, but also to prioritize investment in additional import
infrastructure in order to facilitate a diversification of supply. Most importantly, this paper strongly
urges increased EU solidarity in terms of energy policy cohesiveness to avoid a Russian exploitation of
its dominant EU energy market share. This analysis is divided into three sections, considers
perspectives gathered from a wide variety of secondary sources, and also incorporates opinions from
five interviews conducted with selected contributing scholars in the Nord Stream and European energy
security discourses. The first section of the paper will provide a general background to natural gas, the
current EU-Russian energy relationship, and the origins of Nord Stream 2. The second section, the bulk
of the study, contains a state-by-state analysis of the geopolitical interests of the three geostrategic
players involved in the European energy contention, and also other European states which have voiced
opposition to the Nord Stream 2 in order to defend their geopolitical interests. The third section will
offer policy prescriptions to the actors involved in the situation. Finally, a brief conclusion will
summarize the points made in this analysis and identify possible extensions of research on this topic.
Key Words: Nord Stream 2; geopolitics; geoeconomics; energy security; natural gas; European Union

Abbreviations
EU – European Union
EC – European Commission
US – United States
FSU – Former Soviet Union (states)
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
IEA – International Energy Agency
EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone
SEM – Single European Market
LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas
Bcm – Billion cubic meters (related to amount of gas)
Bcf – Billion cubic feet (related to amount of gas)
Twh – Terawatt hours (related to amount of gas)
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Introduction
The EU energy market presents both Russia and the United States with the opportunity to pursue
their geopolitical interests in Europe. The issue of energy security in the European Union is a
paramount concern to all EU member states, as domestic production declines and import dependency on
foreign suppliers climbs. With the European Union requiring highest import demand for energy
resources in the world, Russia has enjoyed substantial economic gains from its monopoly on exporting
oil and natural gas to the European energy markets. Now, the United States has attempted to challenge
this Russian market domination with its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, coming from a booming
shale gas sector. The most recent controversial development in this economic conflict is Russia’s
proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline, running from Russia to the northern coast of Germany. This paper
aims to dissect Nord Stream 2 in the context of the geopolitical and geoeconomic motives of three
geostrategic actors, Russia, the United States, and Germany. Many pieces of academic literature have
been published about the pipeline since its announcement in 2015, arguing over whether the pipeline is a
commercially-based enterprise or a geopolitical strategy by Russia to increase EU dependence on its gas
and circumvent eastern transit countries, most importantly Ukraine. The original objective to this essay
was to discover which arguments in this debate held the most validity, and what that implied for EU
energy security. Upon researching different perspectives and conducting five interviews with
contributing scholars in the Nord Stream 2 discourse, the focus was adapted to provide a more nuanced
understanding of the pipeline project in the broader geopolitical context of EU energy trade. By paying
too much heed to inconsequential details of national politics, or by deliberately choosing to ignore the
big picture of the geopolitical contest over the European Union between Russia and the United States,
one fails to fully comprehend the significance of Nord Stream 2. Framing the project in either
commercial or political terms only serves to further the geopolitical interests of an actor with stake in the
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pipeline. Thus, the central argument to this geopolitical analysis fully accepts Nord Stream 2 as a
commercially-based project, but also asserts that the geopolitical as well as the geoeconomic
implications of the pipeline should not be ignored. This essay will rest on the assertion that a shift in the
energy security paradigm occurred at the end of the Cold War that now causes states to favor
geoeconomic considerations more heavily than the geopolitical, a framework described in detail at the
beginning of the second section. Inspired by Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard, the concept
of the EU energy market will be occasionally depicted as a European geopolitical chessboard where
Russia has the United States in check with the expansion of its Northern Corridor. By pivoting between
analyzing Nord Stream 2 on a detailed, micro-level and this theoretical, geostrategic macro-level,
policymakers can recognize each state’s veiled motives, predict states’ actions multiple steps ahead of
the current situation, and craft better strategies to ensure the economic security for its state.

Literature Review
This paper’s worldview is largely inspired by the 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard, authored
by the former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski’s objective in writing the
book was to formulate a geostrategy for the United States to maintain its primacy on the Eurasian
landscape. His central thesis warns the United States to prevent a Eurasian power coalition with the
capability to dominate the Eurasian landmass, challenging US pre-eminence. Quotes from the book are
used to put the current power struggle over the EU energy market into a geostrategic context.
The Nord Stream 2 discourse features scholars with differing perceptions of the situation, with
the disagreements largely occurring in how one views Russia as the primary energy supplier of the
European Union. This study incorporated works from authors with both objective and subjective points
of view on Nord Stream 2 in order to understand the facts behind the pipeline and also dissect the
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opinions of actors with geopolitical stake in the project. Professor Andreas Goldthau at King’s College
in London provides a thorough objective analysis of Nord Stream 2 in his piece, “Assessing Nord
Stream 2: regulation, geopolitics & energy security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe & the UK.”
However, this study focuses mainly on supply and demand data rather than discussing global power
dynamics, and disregards Germany and the United States. “Nord Stream 2 – A Political and Economic
Contextualisation” by Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal provides another comprehensive approach
to viewing Nord Stream 2 from multiple angles, but omits the United States as a relevant geostrategic
actor. This paper differs from these analyses by assessing the situation in a broader geostrategic context
and including recent developments affecting Nord Stream 2, namely the 2017 US sanctions against
Russia.
For an understanding of the introduced concept of geoeconomics as the new primary driver of
states’ geostrategies, Christopher M. Dent’s article, “Economic Security” covers the idea that economic
strategies contribute to a state’s security. Adnan Vatansever’s “Is Russia building too many pipelines?
Explaining Russia’s oil and gas export strategy,” then articulates the idea that Russia’s complex
pipeline network is a geoeconomic strategy to protect its own economic energy security. Another article
co-authored by Goldthau and Nick Sitter that guided ideas in this study is, “Soft power with a hard edge:
EU policy tools and energy security,” which describes the methods employed by the European Union to
use its Single European Market (SEM) as a strategic tool to further EU geopolitical interests and
safeguard its energy security.

Research Methodology
This paper relies on both quantitative and qualitative data extracted from a range of secondary
sources in order to build an opinion-based geopolitical argument and back it up with statistics. The
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quantitative data is taken from published reports detailing the world and EU natural gas markets,
including the IEA’s “Key world energy statistics” and the European Commission’s “Quarterly Report
on European Gas Markets” both published in 2017. Raw statistics from sources including CIA World
Factbook, BP’s Statistical Worldview of Energy 2017, and numbers from the official websites of
Gazprom and Nord Stream AG are also incorporated.
As listed in the literature review section, this paper builds an argument based on the academic
literature surrounding the Nord Stream 2 debate, the dynamics of the EU gas market, and theoretical
geostrategic power competition to provide a multi-layered analysis. In addition, opinionated news
articles and blog posts on these topics that support the thesis of this paper are cited. This qualitative data
will be bolstered by the quantitative statistics in an attempt to reinforce the core assumptions of this
paper.
Lastly, five interviews, four formal and one informal, were conducted with well-informed
scholars specializing in different aspects of this multifaceted topic. Each interviewee retained the right
to decline from being quoted in this paper and were informed of how their contribution would be
utilized. Interviews were all conducted in Switzerland and the subjects included two university
professors, one researcher at a security policy think-tank, one former Special Energy Counselor for the
North Sea, and the Nord Stream AG company at its headquarters in Zug. This diverse array of
backgrounds provided this study with multiple different perspectives on how to examine the Nord
Stream 2 and were instrumental in formulating the key points of this study.

Section I: Background
1.1 The Importance of Natural Gas
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According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), natural gas accounts for 22% of
worldwide energy consumption, and constitutes one quarter of electricity generation.1 Global gas
demand is projected to continue to increase by approximately 1.6% for the next five years until 2022,
while estimates forecast that the usage of other fossil fuels will wane in the coming decades.23 Natural
gas remains the only viable fossil fuel that will maintain a pivotal role in the future of the world energy
mix, due to its numerous advantages over to the rest of the hydrocarbon family. Natural gas is an
extremely versatile fuel source and is used for electricity generation, for domestic purposes, in the
industrial and manufacturing sectors, and in transportation as vehicle fuel.4 Gas reserves are able to last
in excess of 60 years, as opposed to a maximum of 40 years for oil.5 Most importantly, natural gas is the
most environmentally-friendly fossil fuel, producing about half as much carbon dioxide as oil when
burnt.6 Many environmentalists view natural gas as the crucial bridge between the dirty fossil fuels of
the past and clean renewable energy sources of the future. During the next three decades, dirty
petroleum products and coal will reach peak demand and subsequently become phased out to protect the
environment in a new era scholars referred to as “The Great Transition.” During this time, natural gas
demand will continue to grow past 2050, and potentially even beyond 2060 with the proper investment
and innovation, according to the World Energy Council.7 The World Energy Council puts great
emphasis on ensuring that natural gas maintains a substantial share of the global energy mix past 2060
until the transition to renewable sources can be realized.8 This is an achievable goal given the large

“Natural Gas,” International Energy Agency.
“Importance of Natural Gas,” Hazira LNG & Port.
3
See figure 1.1.1
4
“Uses,” NaturalGas.org, September 20, 2013.
5
“Natural Gas,” Hazira LNG & Port.
6
Ibid.
7
“The Role of Natural Gas (Perspective from the 2016 World Energy Scenarios),” World Energy Council,
November 2017.
8
Ibid.
1
2
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abundance of proven natural gas reserves located mainly in the Middle East, North Africa, Russia and
the United States. Natural gas will thus serve as the primary catalyst to bring about a new era of energy
consumption, largely based on efficiency and environmental protection.
International gas markets throughout the world have significantly expanded in the wake of
technological innovations that have provided massive increases in the world energy supply. The IEA’s
Market Report Series: Gas 2017 details the state of the natural gas industry: “The natural gas market is
undergoing a fundamental transformation… Heavily oversupplied markets, the ongoing shale-gas
revolution in the United States… and the fast-growing LNG trade are disrupting traditional gas business
and pricing models. This is forcing market players to redefine their strategies and explore new
markets.”9 In a world no longer characterized by scarce energy resources, suppliers are now competing
against one another in a struggle to export their natural resources to the most lucrative markets. Gas
pipeline networks have evolved in recent decades to facilitate trade between states with large resource
endowments and those with the highest import demand. A prime example of this relationship is

Figure 1.1.1: Global Gas Demand 2002-2022 (Source: International Energy Agency)

9

“Market Report Series: Gas 2017,” International Energy Agency, 2017. Online.
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between Russia and the European Union. Russia possesses about a quarter of the world’s proven gas
reserves, and the European Union imports the most natural gas out of any market in the world - at
approximately 420bcm in 2016. To put this into perspective, the next largest gas importer is Japan,
which imports just a fraction of this amount, at 124.7bcm..10 The European Union now enjoys an
oversupply in the world’s energy resources while Russia competes to maintain its dominant market
share of EU imports.

1.2 Overview of EU-Russia Gas Trade

Figure 1.2.1: EU imports of natural gas by source, 2014-2017, measured in TWh (Source: European Commission Quarterly Report on the
Gas Market, 2017)
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“Country Comparison: Natural Gas – Imports,” The World Factbook, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
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The nexus of the EU-Russian relationship is the energy factor, specifically natural gas trade.
Russia is Europe’s predominant energy supplier,11 and the EU is reciprocally Russia’s most important
customer for its hydrocarbon exports, which comprise approximately 70% as the heart of the Russian
economy. In 2016, 39.7% of the natural gas the European Union consumed was imported from Russia,
representing a .6% increase from the previous year.12 Russia produced 579.4bcm of gas in 2016 and
exported 190.8bcm through its pipelines, with 142.9bcm going to the European Union.13 Nearly threequarters of Russian gas exports are directed towards the European market, indicating Russia’s heavy
economic reliance on the European Union. According to Eurogas, EU gas demand is expected to have
increased by about 6% in 2016 from the year before to around 447bcm, following a previous rise of 4%
in 2015.14 This is due to the recent decline of EU domestic energy production, and is expected to fall by
50% within the next 20 years, forcing the EU to rely even more heavily on imports. Norway, the second
largest gas supplier to the EU, has begun to cut its gas exports to the EU due to the depletion of its
supply and its prioritization of domestic consumption.15 Challenges including political corruption and
lack of infrastructure prevent other supplies, such as the North Africa, Middle East, and Caspian Sea
regions, from providing the European Union with sufficient gas quantities. Thus, a mutual dependence
between the European Union and Russia has formed, creating a dynamic some scholars have termed an
“energy security dilemma.”16 The prosperity of European Union energy imports and Russian gas
exports hinge on one another, and both actors have begun to take proactive steps to reduce the
dependence on each other, in turn making the other less secure. Russia has pivoted to the east for

11

See figure 1.2.1
“EU imports of energy products - recent developments,” Eurostat.
13
“BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2017,” BP, 2017.
14
“Eurogas: Gas demand in EU rises for the first time in four years, according to new Eurogas data,” 4-traders,
March 30, 2016.
15
Matt Slowikowski, “Can Norway Supply Europe With Gas Long-Term?,” OilPrice.com, September 4, 2016.
16
Andrew Judge, Thomas Maltby, and Jack D. Sharples, “Challenging Reductionism in Analyses of EU-Russia
Energy Relations,” Geopolitics 21, no. 4 (2016), published online September 29, 2016,
12
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markets for its oil and gas exports, while the EU has looked toward suppliers in the Caspian Sea region
as well as the emerging United States liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply for future long-term sources
that can balance its imports from Russia. The fact remains, however, Russia and the European Union
will remain tied together through each country’s respective energy-related needs, and gas trade between
the two is expected to increase in the coming years.

1.3 Nord Stream
To facilitate Russian-EU cooperation, Moscow’s 51% state-owned energy behemoth Gazprom is
investing in pipeline projects in both Northern and Southern Europe to provide the capacity for
increased gas exports to the EU. The most controversial project is the Nord Stream 2, an offshore
pipeline proposed to run through the Baltic Sea starting at the Ust-Luga port in Russia, home to the
largest gas fields in the world, and emptying in the northern coastal town in Greifswald, Germany.17

Figure 2.3.1: Northern Corridor transit route, consisting of two parallel Nord Stream lines with an export capacity of
110bcm. (Source: Gazprom, Nord Stream 2: Significance)

17

See figure 1.3.1.
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The pipeline was declared in 2015 after Germany and Russia found the first Nord Stream to be a
success.
The original Nord Stream line was established and functional at the end of 2012, consisting of a
twin set of pipelines that combined for a capacity of 55bcm of gas. Nord Stream 2 will run parallel to its
predecessor, adding a third and fourth pipeline to the route and doubling the export capacity of the line
to 110bcm of gas.18 The Nord Stream route defines the ‘Northern Corridor’ of the Baltic Sea, and with
the construction of Nord Stream 2, the offshore transit route could facilitate well over half of Russia’s
gas exports to the European Union. Nord Stream runs 1,224 kilometers long and stretches through the
territorial waters and/or the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and
Germany.19 The pipelines are also of geographical relevance to Poland and Baltic states Estonia,
Lithuania, and Latvia. Gazprom is the sole shareholder of the privately-funded project, but has received
considerable investment from European companies, including German Uniper and Wintershall, Austrian
OMV, British Shell, and French ENGIE, each contributing 950 million euros.20 The Nord Stream line is
said to have minimal environmental impact on the Baltic Sea, with a monitoring system in place to
detect any threat to the Baltic ecosystems.21
The project has caused major divide within the EU between western and eastern countries, which
possess differing perspectives on Russia’s role as the primary EU energy supplier. It has also drawn
international pressure from the United States, which has repeatedly urged the EU to reduce its
dependence on Russian gas. Nord Stream 2 faces many obstacles in the way to its realization, and
carries with it strong political, geopolitical, and geoeconomic implications. Nord Stream 2 has been
criticized by a wide range of countries who decry the pipeline as contradictory to the EU internal energy

18

Ibid.
Ibid.
20
“Shareholder and Financial Investors,” Nord Stream 2.
21
“Environment,” Nord Stream 2.
19
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market and fear it will increase the Union’s dependence on Russian gas. Poland has been the most vocal
about its opposition to the Nord Stream pipeline. Perhaps most importantly, Nord Stream 2 faces
skepticism from the European Commission (EC) in Brussels regarding the legality of the project and its
effect on the internal European energy market. The Commission aims to establish a cohesive Energy
Union within Europe characterized by competitive prices and limited foreign imports.

Section II: A Geopolitical Analysis of Nord Stream 2
In order to fully comprehend Nord Stream 2 in the context of global power dynamics, one must
understand the shift in the paradigm of security that has unfolded since the end of the Cold War. As
explained in Christopher M. Dent’s article, Economic Security, “the growing interest in economic
security analysis should be understood in a post-Cold War context, centering on the respective shifts
from geopolitics to geoeconomics, from military superpowers to economic superpowers, and hence from
politico-ideological competition to economic competition.”22 In the realm of energy security, the
invention of new technologies in the past three decades has led to the discovery of vast amounts of
energy materials in the earth, a drastic change in an environment once characterized by states quarrelling
over a scarcity of natural resources. Today, markets are the means through which an international actor
can sell its surplus natural resources to guarantee its economic security and prosperity. The European
Union, a region with a very limited capacity to produce its own energy for consumption, now enjoys the
upper hand in this new concept of economic energy security. As Professor Samuele Furfari put it, “the
new energy situation is that we have passed from the supply market to a client market, and that is a big
change. It’s why the price of oil will fall and continue to be flat.”23 The geopolitical struggle of

22
23

Christopher M. Dent “Economic Security”
Samuele Furfari, Informal Interview
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securing scarce energy materials has been rendered obsolete, and the situation has now reversed into a
geoeconomic contest where countries with abundant energy assets will compete for commercial gain by
attracting the best markets, thus fortifying their economic security.24 With the change in paradigm
comes an entirely new set of strategies for countries to utilize in pursuit of commercial advantage. Some
of these include economic sanctions, intensive lobbying, state support to its national and private
businesses, and hidden protectionist measures.25 Most importantly for this paper, structured systems of
market laws and regulations have become an important economic security tool for energy consumers to
force foreign suppliers to adhere to the rules that benefit the market and shield against exploitation.
Another key development in this new paradigm articulated by Dent is that armed conflict between
militaries is no longer feasible between the developed countries, due to the vastly unmatched Western
military capabilities and the emergence of nuclear weapons, and instead has been replaced with
economic warfare.26 However, while commercial considerations will now often outweigh the political in
the absence of traditional warfare, geopolitical interests will always be intertwined with the
geoeconomic and they remain an important factor in global power dynamics,. In the debate over Nord
Stream 2, those looking to frame the project exclusively in either a geopolitical or commercial context
must shift their understanding of the energy security paradigm to one that fits the new international order
of geoeconomics. Thus, this paper fully accepts the claim that Nord Stream 2 itself is mainly driven by
commercial aspirations on the German and even on the Russian fronts. However, Nord Stream 2 is also
the most recent strategic move by Russia in a geoeconomic game against the United States for the prize

24

Geopolitics, in this analysis, is differentiated from geoeconomics and broadly refers to the strategies employed
by a state to gain political and economic advantages in relation to its geographical setting. Geoeconomics, on the
other hand, refers to the economic methods a state uses to achieve its geopolitical interests.
25
Gyula Csurgai, “Geoeconomic strategies and economic intelligence,” Advances in Geoeconomics, ed. J. Mark
Munoz (Routledge, 2017).
26
Economic warfare refers to conflicts where states use tools to intentionally weaken the economies of their
opponents in order to coerce them into conceding to foreign policy demands.
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of the EU energy market. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book The Grand Chessboard, quotes former
Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi who said soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
“Whoever becomes the master of [Eurasia] will become the master of the world.”27 This section will
analyze the political and economic geostrategies used by the main players vying for influence on the
European energy chessboard within the context of the Nord Stream 2 project.

2.1 EU Energy Security, Diversification, and Dependence on Russian Gas
Following the gas crisis of 2009 between Moscow and Kiev, when the Kremlin decided to cut
off gas supplies through Ukraine to Europe, the European Commission enacted the Third Energy
Package in support of the internal energy market in Europe. The Package was the third in a set of
liberalization directives initiated in the 1990s that aimed to gradually open the European electricity and
natural gas markets to competition. In essence, these sets of laws and goals for the energy aspect of the
Single European Market (SEM) aim to integrate EU interstate supply routes to enhance energy security
and market competition.28 These energy market rules aim to mitigate the potential for any foreign
monopoly to exploit the SEM by employing antitrust investigations and enacting laws on third party
access to onshore EU pipelines.29 In addition, energy policymakers have hoped to phase out long term
contracts with foreign suppliers in favor of diversified transactions between public and private European
energy companies in order to stimulate internal market growth.30 This use of internal regulation to force
foreign suppliers to play by the rules of the market represents a geoeconomic strategy in the European
internal market that will safeguard it from monopolies and produce the most favorable outcomes in

27

Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (New
York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), 111.
28
Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter, “Soft power with a hard edge: EU policy tools and energy security,” Review
of International Political Economy 22, no. 5 (2015): 941-965,
29 “Market legislation,” European Commission, European Union, accessed November 21, 2017.
30 Ibid.
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energy trade with suppliers. Through the diligent implementation of these laws to increase the
functionality of the SEM, European energy consumers would be able to enjoy competitive gas prices, a
diverse range of suppliers, and heightened economic energy security.
Thus, in the past three decades, there is no doubt that the European energy market has become
more interconnected than ever, especially cross continental Western to Central

Figure 2.1.1: Map of European Pipeline Gas Flows. (Source: Nord Stream AG, Company Presentation)

and Eastern European (CEE) countries.31 The ability of Western European states to efficiently transfer
gas to its eastern counterparts will help buffer supply shocks and promote competition between private
European energy companies. The addition of Nord Stream 2 will double the capacity for gas supply in
the ‘Northern Corridor’ of the Baltic Sea, allowing European private companies to take advantage of

31

See figure 2.1.1
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heightened supply and in turn, European consumers will enjoy decreased prices. In an interview with
Severin Fischer, a Senior Researcher in the Global Security Team at the Center for Security Studies in
Zürich, he explained that the European Union’s market advantage gives it the upper hand in gas trade,
saying, “a single infrastructure project in the size of no more than 13 percent of the EU’s total yearly
consumption in 2015 cannot threaten the EU as a whole. This favorable gas position rather forces
suppliers to enter into a price competition that will be for the benefit of European gas consumers.”32
However, opponents of the Nord Stream 2 continue to highlight the ominous threat of another
Russian abuse of its geopolitical gas leverage, writing off the pipeline as a misguided project that will
dangerously increase the European Union’s dependence on imports from Gazprom. In reality, these
anti-Russian sentiments have been rendered obsolete by the changing geoeconomic dynamics of energy
security. Russia depends more heavily on its oil and gas exports to the EU than the EU does on
Gazprom; approximately two thirds of Russia’s fossil fuel exports are directed toward the EU. This
Russian dependence was exemplified in the 2009 Ukraine gas cutoff, when Gazprom suffered a loss of
approximately $1.5 billion USD.33 For a state-owned company that was named the ‘most profitable’ in
2012 for accumulating over $40 billion USD in profits, this may not seem like a substantial amount - but
the situation has changed for both Gazprom and the Russian economy. In 2013, Gazprom accounted for
8% of Russia’s entire GDP, and following the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the energy
giant’s net profit fell an estimated 70%,34 due to a combination of factors including a depreciated ruble,
plummeting oil prices, and economic sanctions from the European Union and the United States. At the
end of 2016, Russia’s economy finally returned to a positive growth rate after seven consecutive
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Severin Fischer, Formal Interview.
Andreas Goldthau, “Assessing Nord Stream 2: regulation, geopolitics & energy security in the EU, Central
Eastern Europe & the UK,” European Center for Energy and Resource Security (London, UK: King’s College,
2016).
34 Ivana Kottasova, “Russia's Gazprom: Profits plunge 70%,” CNN, March 13, 2015.
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quarters of contraction, but still faces challenges from the lingering effects of these pitfalls.35 Therefore,
with a struggling Russian economy, another state-ordered gas cutoff would likely bear insurmountable
losses for Russia’s top revenue producing company. Furthermore, Moscow can no longer afford to
misuse its dominant market share of EU energy imports and it further risk losing credibility as a reliable
supplier, especially considering the European Union has already begun investing in diversifying its
energy suppliers. The energy security paradigm has been reversed, with the Russian supplier now
catering to the demands of the EU importer in a desperate struggle by Gazprom to maintain its share of
its most important source of revenue.
While the geoeconomic aspects of the EU’s gas relations with Russia are the primary driving
factor in the construction of the Nord Stream 2, one cannot discount the politically charged context of
the proposed pipeline. Nord Stream 2 is the first large-scale infrastructural project since the Kremlin’s
intervention in Ukraine and its disruptive behavior in the war in Syria. Western opponents such as the
United States fear that building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline will serve to finance Russia’s aggressive
foreign policy and allow it to circumvent the sanctions implemented to curb this behavior. Once the
Ukrainian gas transit route has been mostly dried out by Gazprom’s expanded pipeline options, the
question of Moscow’s adjusted geopolitical strategy in eastern Ukraine looms as an important political
development. In addition, political unrest within the EU itself detracts from Nord Stream 2’s appeal,
with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker saying he has a “strong preference for
pipelines that unite rather than for pipelines that divide.”36 Whether the project goes against the core
principles of the European bloc’s energy union to diversify suppliers remains a strictly political debate
causing divisions between European countries with differing perspectives and interests. It is indeed true
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that Nord Stream 2 will be yet another existing pipeline for Russian gas imports, and does not
correspond with the EU’s goal of investing in infrastructure that allows for the diversification of
suppliers. This issue will be analyzed toward the end of the paper in the policy and recommendations
section.

2.2 Germany
Germany has adamantly backed the Nord Stream 2 project as an exclusively commercial
enterprise that will increase continental European energy security through the additional influx of cheap
gas in the SEM. At the same time, Germany, having the potential to become the future leader of the
European Union, is the most vocal proponent of EU integration and cohesiveness. Following the United
Kingdom’s 2016 decision to exit the European Union, Germany’s robust export-oriented economy has
become the locomotive of European commercial activity. Germany benefits greatly from its massive
exports to its neighboring EU member states, enjoying a free market for sales, a common currency that
benefits it, and a system of regulations that protects its industry, all under EU principle. However,
Brzezinski warns in The Grand Chessboard, “if the unification and enlargement of Europe should stall,
there is some reason to assume that a more nationalist definition of Germany’s concept of the European
‘order’ would then surface, to the potential detriment of European stability.”37 Germany faces diverging
geopolitical objectives with the preservation of its national economic security with the Nord Stream 2
project, which has challenged its interests of promoting EU solidarity. Germany’s somewhat
contradictory motivation to politically back the Nord Stream 2 project, while certainly based in
commercial interests, nonetheless carries with it political consequences and geopolitical implications.
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As it has done with the Nord Stream line, Germany will now look to the east and attempt to
collaborate and ease tensions with its old adversary, Russia, under the new geoeconomic energy
paradigm. Without the threat of military intervention, Germany no longer sees Russia as a strategic
threat, but rather as an economic partner that can supply cheap gas to fuel Germany’s dynamic
commercial activities. Russia depends both on exporting gas to Germany more than it does to any other
European country: Germany was Russia’s third largest trade partner in 2016, while Russia ranked only
as Germany’s thirteenth. Germany had a nearly 5 billion euro trade deficit with Russia in 2016,
implying the Russian import market is relatively insignificant for Germany’s export-oriented
commercial interests.38 On the other hand, Germany was Europe’s top gas consumer in 2016 at 38
million tonnes oil equivalent, a 9.2% increase from the previous year.39 According to BP, Russia
supplied Germany with 46bcm of pipeline gas in 2016, the top destination for Gazprom exports in
Europe.40 These statistics elucidate the mutual dependence these two countries share with each other in
terms of energy trade, and with the construction of Nord Stream 2 establishing Germany as the EU hub
for Russian gas, this Moscow-Berlin economic partnership will undeniably become vastly more
important for the broader Russian-EU relationship. coming months will be a telling indicator of the true
geopolitical power of Germany.
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The Nord Stream 2 pipeline will flow directly into Germany’s northern border and deposit cheap
natural gas, which will trickle down into the downstream markets in the European Union. The onshore
OPAL and EUGAL (in development) extensions of the Nord Stream line connect Germany to the
existing pipeline grid between Eastern and Western Europe, efficiently spreading gas throughout the
European Union. This pipeline network will position Germany as the main EU energy distributor and

Figure 2.2.1: OPAL and EUGAL onshore extensions
(taken from the Internet, Interfax.com)

further cement Germany as the key political and economic cog of the European Union. However,
Germany must still be cautious in its dealings with Gazprom, as the OPAL line has been harshly
criticized for providing Gazprom control over onshore gas transit in Germany. The German energy
regulator attempted to exempt OPAL from regulation, claiming third party access was required for the
proper functioning of the transit pipeline.41 The EC has begun to investigate OPAL to determine
whether it is in breach of the laws of the EU internal energy market. The EUGAL extension, on the

41

Reuters, “Germany rules favorably on OPAL gas pipeline,” February 25, 2009.

Wilson, David E. 24
other hand, has not received criticism because Gazprom will not have control over its transit functions.
Both extensions possess the capability to transit gas into lines that could reach the easternmost point of
Europe. The politicized nature of the proposed pipeline network resulting from contrasting European
views of Russia as a reliable energy supplier has thrust Germany into a position to receive major
political backlash from the project’s opposition. Germany is now forced to find a balance between its
commercial interests and its political reputation within the European Union. The finesse in which
Germany balances its ongoing energy flirtations with Moscow with its role as the leader of the European
Union will surely influence EU solidarity and perhaps the future of Ukraine.

2.3 Russia
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In an interview with Toralf Pilz, a former German Special Energy Counselor for the North Sea,
he stressed the importance of remembering the breakup of the Soviet Union when assessing the modern
day energy puzzle. Prior to the end of the Cold War, Moscow had employed a geopolitical strategy by
constructing and owning pipelines running through FSU states in an effort to control them. Pilz
mentioned that once the FSU countries became independent, they crafted their own energy policies and
enjoyed the inherited Soviet-installed pipeline infrastructure. Most significant was Moscow’s forfeiture
of Ukraine at the end of the Cold War, which implied major geopolitical consequences for Russia’s
connection to Europe. The Soviet Union’s complex pipeline network spanned through many of its
surrounding satellite states and most of them convened in Ukraine before entering Europe (see Figure
2.3.1). Brzezinski describes Ukraine, “a new and important space on the Eurasian chessboard, is a
geopolitical pivot because its very existence as an independent country helps to transform Russia.
Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. Russia without Ukraine can still strive for
imperial status, but it would them become a predominantly Asian imperial state…”42 This holds true
today as Ukraine represents an entire pipeline network Russia can no longer fully utilize in its relations
with Europe.
Some opponents of Nord Stream 2 have questioned Russia’s need for additional pipelines,
arguing that Russia’s current export infrastructure is already sufficient to cater to Europe’s energy
demand. Considering Ukraine’s unreliability as a transit route, increasing European import demand for
energy, and the overall increase in competition from alternative energy sources such as US LNG and
Caspian Sea gas, Gazprom’s heavy investment in pipeline infrastructure projects reflects both
commercial and geopolitical interests. Russia plans to reduce dependence on gas transit through
Ukraine via the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, doubling the capacity of the Northern Corridor transit route and
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providing flexibility of which export routes Russia selects. As the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2,
Gazprom will fund half of the 8 billion euro project cost, receiving the other half in funds from
European energy company investments.43 In case Nord Stream 2 faces complications that delay its
construction, Russia has proposed another pipeline called the TurkStream that transits Turkey into
southern Europe, replacing the abandoned South Stream project cancelled in 2014. TurkStream will cost
an additional 11.4 billion euros, though it is uncertain what fraction of this Gazprom will cover.44 These
massive investments in energy infrastructure in the Northern and Southern Corridors underline Russia’s
geoeconomic strategy of expanding its choice of export routes in order to promote its economic energy
security.
Russia’s ulterior motive behind the construction of Nord Stream 2 is the direct connection with
Germany. From a commercial standpoint, Giacomo Luciani, a professor at the Graduate Institute of
Geneva and a leading expert on the geopolitics of energy, put it best. He explained, “to understand the
attitude of Gazprom, you must take into account the fact that it wants to integrate downstream as close
as possible to the final consumer. They do not want to sell gas early on in the supply chain. That
justifies Nord Stream because they want to get directly into Germany, because Germany is its single
most important client. It wants to have a personal relationship that is not interfered with by any EU
concern or institution, something that Brussels cannot influence.”45 When Gazprom exports through
pipelines traversing Ukraine, it racks up transit fees passing through multiple countries en route to the
biggest consumer, Germany. By building a direct pipeline to Germany’s northern shore, it can sell gas
at the technical EU border and avoid the scope of EC legal jurisdiction that constrains its onshore
networks. On the geopolitical level, Germany’s significant dependence on gas imports combined with
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its newfound nationalist swagger has provided Russia with a window of opportunity to appeal to a rising
world power that could assist in the expulsion of American primacy on the eastern Eurasian continent.
Russia and Germany both recognize the potential for their strategic partnership in supporting the others’
economic security. As Russia pivots to the east, Russia will attempt to forge a symmetrical partnership
as Germany with China, fueling and trading with the rapidly developing Chinese economy. Russia sees
itself as the catalyst of a Eurasian trifecta with Germany and China, the world’s most explosive
economies linked up via cheap pipeline gas to the world’s largest fields of natural resources. This exact
power coalition is the precise threat that Brzezinski devotes The Grand Chessboard to as a warning for
the United States. Thus, Russia aims to use the expanded Nord Stream line as a fueling cable to one of
two economic powerhouses in pursuit of a return to its former imperial glory.

2.4 The United States of America
The rapidly expanding LNG market will be altered dynamically in the coming years with the
addition of exports coming from the US shale industry, which will account for 40% of the world’s extra
gas production to 2022.46 From exporting next to nothing, more than half of the projected US gas
production increase will be used for LNG exports, catapulting the United States to become one of the
top LNG producers in the world in just a few short years.47 A few months ago, the United States
shipped the first crate of LNG to a terminal in Poland, a symbolic message from one of the most vocal
countries in favor of reducing its energy dependence on Russia. In addition, Lithuania and Croatia have
also begun to develop new LNG terminals in anticipation of gas coming from across the Atlantic. 48
Despite these positive developments, US LNG faces stiff competition against cheap and accessible
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Russian pipeline gas, and the Nord Stream 2 presents Washington with an ominous foreboding of
Gazprom’s fastened monopoly on the European energy market. While the Kremlin owns a controlling
51% of Gazprom’s shares, the United States lacks a nationalized energy company through which it can
direct its natural gas supplies. From the perspective of American gas companies, prices in the European
market are currently less favorable than those created by the growing demand in the Asia-Pacific region,
and until this changes, US LNG exports will likely be shipped eastbound instead. Thus, the United
States faces challenges from Moscow in its future plans to forge an energy relationship with Europe, and
will have to strategically decipher how to penetrate Gazprom’s control of the EU energy market.
The United States has long been averse to any sort of EU-Russian cooperation, dating back to the
Ronald Reagan administration chastising the European Union for purchasing Soviet gas and oil.49 After
the fall of the Berlin wall, as explained by Zbiegniew Brzezinski in his book, The Grand Chessboard,
the United States’ main geostrategic imperative was to prevent the emergence of an alliance between
two great powers on the Eurasian continent that would deteriorate US influence in the European
Union.50 That coalition today would likely consist of a national interest-focusing Germany extending a
partnership with an energy resource-rich Russia. To prevent this geopolitical coalition, the United States
needed to push for the expansion of both the European Union, in order to create a unified Europe able to
act as an economic and security actor on its own, and NATO, so that the trans-Atlantic alliance would
remain intact and sustain American primacy. At the time of The Grand Chessboard’s publication in
1997, Brzezinski had little concern that such a power coalition would emerge to challenge America’s
domination for quite some time, but he warned that, “it would require not only a massive mishandling
by America of its European policy but also a dramatic reorientation on the art of the key European
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states.”51 Less than thirty years later, it seems that American-European relations have begun to slide in
the wake of major political upheavals, including Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and an
unanticipated resurgence of Russian power.
Ukraine, a geopolitical pivot state on the European landscape, represents an opportunity for the
United States to restrain a German-Russian alliance from being actualized. When Moscow annexed
Crimea in 2014, the United States along with the European Union responded with joint sanctions to
punish Russia’s aggressive foreign policy. Neutralizing the conflict in Ukraine is of utmost importance
to Washington policymakers, who want to prevent Russia from regaining control over its former satellite
state and using it to become geostrategically closer to Western Europe. A Moscow-controlled Ukraine
would give Gazprom access to the significant Ukrainian pipeline infrastructure previously forfeited
following the breakup of the Soviet Union. If Russia can exert its influence through Ukraine, it
advances closer to the possible seduction of a geopolitical relationship with Germany. While the West
has collaborated effectively to respond to the Ukraine crisis, the United States must tread carefully in
how it pushes back against Russia, as the risk of collateral damage to its European allies threatens to
jeopardize the stability of the trans-Atlantic partnership.
The 2014 sanctions against Russia displayed a close partnership between two Western allies,
sensitive of the others’ interests and conducive to each actor’s ambitions in the eastern European region.
However, despite careful planning, the European economy suffered a loss of approximately 90 billion
euros in the two years that followed, due to a counter embargo from Russia on the EU agriculture
industry.52 A sharp change in US policy occurred in 2017 when Congress voted unanimously to pass
the, “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,” in further response to the Ukraine
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crisis and in light of the accusations of Russian meddling in the 2016 US Presidential election. These
sanctions broadly targeted any foreign investors in the development and maintenance of Russian
pipeline projects, including the Nord Stream 2.53 This unilateral action sparked outrage from European
companies, especially German firms,54 with ties to Russian energy developments. Much to
Washington’s dismay, the European and Russian economies are strongly intertwined in matters of
energy security, arguably the most important concern of EU officials. The United States cannot
continue to wage economic warfare against Russia without impacting European companies, especially
those in the energy sector. Russia has used its monopoly on the European energy market as a hostage
shield against US countermeasures to its foreign policy in Ukraine, and while not proven, perhaps
allowed Moscow to meddle in the 2016 US election. The United States has zero economic leverage in
preventing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from being constructed, but this did not stop Congress from
taking a rash shot at Germany’s precious energy infrastructure project with Russia. Continuing on this
path of economic warfare against a retaliatory Russia will only serve to backfire against US geostrategic
interests in the form of exacerbated resentment from a European ally with an important future export
market and precariously overlapping interests with Moscow.

2.5 Poland, Ukraine, and Central Eastern Europe
Some CEE countries largely see Nord Stream 2 as the means through which Russia can
circumvent the onshore transit routes in their territory and escape paying them substantial pipeline
transit fees. Others support Nord Stream 2 because they are geographically close to Germany, the
source of the gas. However, rerouting Gazprom’s export options with Nord Stream 2 would allow
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Russia to redirect gas flows away from Ukraine and increase its political leverage in the armed conflict
on Ukraine’s eastern territory. This paper does not pay credence to the claim that Nord Stream 2 would
threaten Central Eastern Europe’s energy security, due to the advancements made in the
interconnectivity of Europe’s internal energy transit system.55 These politically-charged fears are vastly
overstated and should not carry substantial weight in the energy security dimension of the Nord Stream
2 discourse. This section will analyze the geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies employed by CEE
countries to protect their commercial interests against the threat of an expansion of the Northern
Corridor transit route.
Despite sharing its western border with Germany, Poland’s geopolitical and commercial interests
will be undermined by the construction of Nord Stream 2. As the acting ringleader of Nord Stream 2
opposition efforts, Poland denounces the pipeline as a geopolitically motivated Russian strategy to ditch
the Ukraine transit route and increase EU dependence on Russian gas via Germany.56 The economic
relationship between Germany and Russia has caused frustration for Poland, complaining that the Nord
Stream 2 is the latest example of Germany pursuing its own national economic interests at the expense
of its eastern neighbors.57 The Yamal pipeline, running from the east in Russia to the west of Europe,
passes through Poland and serves as a source of revenue from transit fees paid by Gazprom. Warsaw
sees Berlin’s Nord Stream 2 efforts as insensitive to the commercial interests of its country, and has
consequently taken steps safeguard its interests. For example, earlier this year, Polish state-run energy
company PGNiG successfully blocked a deal giving Gazprom increased access to the OPAL extension
of Nord Stream, triggering a response from Gazprom to cut gas flow through OPAL by 30 percent.58
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While the European Commission investigates the OPAL pipeline to see if it breaches EU law, Poland
will continue to lobby extensively to reduce Gazprom’s access to OPAL. If Gazprom continues to
exploit its percentage of access of OPAL to hurt Poland, the Commission will likely take note of this
and side with the affected EU member state. Poland has invested in the construction of its own LNG
terminals in the hopes to enter into a long term LNG import contract with the United States once its
contract with Gazprom expires in 2022. As a member of the Three Seas Initiative, a coalition of
countries which all depend heavily on Russian gas, Poland assumed a leadership role in the
diversification of gas supply by being the first EU country to import a shipment of LNG from the United
States.59 Poland could potentially stand as a rival gas hub to Germany if it can successfully manage to
foster an energy relationship with the United States, but it would require an ambitious commitment to
continued infrastructural investment and a decrease in trans-Atlantic LNG import prices. Nevertheless,
the geoeconomic strategies used by Poland to weaken Gazprom’s influence in the EU gas transit system
and increase EU diversification of energy supply will undoubtedly strengthen the economic energy
security of the European Union.
Ukraine is perhaps the country with the most at stake with the construction of the Nord Stream
pipeline. Ukraine collects about $2 billion USD annually in transit fees from Russia, a major source of
revenue for the corruption-ridden country.6061 The loss of these profits would be detrimental to
Naftogaz, the state-owned Ukrainian energy company which alone accounted for 16% of the country’s
budget revenues in the first seven months of 2017.62 Following the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula
by Russia in 2014, the Russian-Ukrainian relationship has been at the center of European politics,
causing waves of sanctions targeting the Russian economy coming from the United States and the
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European Union. Opponents of the pipeline point out that Russia’s ability to transport double amounts
of gas through the Nord Stream 2 addition will allow Russia to entirely cut Ukraine out as a transit route,
severely impacting Ukraine’s political leverage against its aggressive neighbor. Recently, the European
Commission has begun negotiations with Russia and Gazprom to make Nord Stream 2 conditional on a
guarantee from Russia of some amount of continued gas exports through Ukraine.63 How this political
discourse will unfold will be of great consequence to the future of the construction of Nord Stream 2 and
Russian-Ukrainian relations.64
The Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are geographically isolated from the European
Union, possessing relatively independent natural gas infrastructure that once “energy islands.”65 They
rely almost entirely on imports from Gazprom pipelines through Belarus, and worry that Russia could
cut off supply at any time once Nord Stream 2 is constructed. However, similarly to Poland, the Baltic
republics have begun to liberalize their gas markets, and Lithuania already has a invested in and
developed an LNG import terminal. With an interconnected European energy market, the three Baltic
states have the means to promote energy security both independently and with other EU member states.
Other states including the landlocked CEE countries Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
import 95, 89, and 99 percent of their annual natural gas consumption from Russia, respectively.66
Situated between the Czech Republic to its north and Hungary to its south, Slovakia rejects the Nord
Stream 2 as it echoes Poland and Ukraine on losing substantial transit fee revenue.67 However, Hungary
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and the Czech Republic have taken a different approach than the Nord Stream 2 naysayers and have
recently began to cooperate with Russia in terms of agreements to purchase both natural gas and nuclear
technology. The geopolitical rationale behind these countries’ sudden enhancement of economic ties
with Russia is that the landlocked states cannot develop an LNG terminal and are forced to rely on
traditional pipeline infrastructure. Furthermore, Hungary is relatively southern compared to its CEE
counterparts, and gas coming from TurkStream would be easily accessible, just as how Nord Stream gas
for the Czech Republic would be readily available on its northwestern German border. Interestingly,
countries at risk of losing transit fees or not situated geographically near one of the two sea corridors of
gas transit have been the voices spearheading the claim that Russia is an unreliable gas supplier and thus
should cancel the Nord Stream 2 project, for the safety of the entire European Union.

Section III: Future Scenarios and Policy Recommendations
This third and final section will offer opinion-based recommendations to the main geostrategic
players in the European energy game on how to proceed in the Nord Stream 2 dialogue. Despite the
upheaval of the previous international order with the geoeconomic shift in paradigm, energy relations
still remain a crucial aspect to the welfare of a nation, evidenced by the incident in Ukraine and the
economic warfare between the United States and Russia. In the European energy chess game, Moscow
and Washington will continue to butt heads in the attempt to be the primary gas supplier to Europe, and
use this influence to exert primacy in the region. Nord Stream 2 will grant Russia further security in
Gazprom’s current monopoly on the European energy market, to the detriment of Central and Eastern
Europe, as well as US interests in its relations with the European Union and trans-Atlantic LNG exports.
In this context, policy prescriptions for dealing with both the Nord Stream 2 and the energy war for

Wilson, David E. 35
Europe will be tailored to Germany, Russia, the United States, and the European Union, analyzed as a
singular geopolitical actor.

3.1 Germany’s Leadership
Article 194.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) clearly bestows
Germany the right to determine its “conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.”68 Thus, it is in Germany’s best
geostrategic interest to build Nord Stream 2 with the Russian energy champion Gazprom, despite
protests from its eastern neighbors. The European Union is indeed facing difficulties in terms of
cohesiveness, but with the legal authority Germany possesses to take advantage of the Northern Corridor
project, Berlin can use its newfound energy status to cement its position as the leader of the European
Union. Furthermore, against the warnings of many anti-Nord Stream 2 scholars, Germany should use
the pipeline project as a means of pulling Russia closer into the European Union, as opposed to fearing a
Kremlin manipulation of its gas monopoly. This strategy will require the delicate handling of the
appeasement of Central and Eastern European countries, who will likely never diverge in their negative
perceptions of an aggressive Russia. An essential way in which Berlin can maneuver this is by acting as
the primary negotiator with the European Commission on forcing a mandatory quota of Gazprom gas
exports through Ukraine following the construction of Nord Stream 2. This will eliminate the argument
made by opponents that Russia’s sole focus in developing the Northern Corridor is to circumvent
Ukraine and neighboring CEE countries. Russia will have no choice but to comply with these terms, but
may counter-negotiate with its qualms about Ukrainian misconduct as a gas transit state. In addition,
Germany should also begin to invest in LNG infrastructure of its own, or at least heal its strained
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relations with Poland so that the two countries could be a centralized European landing point for US
LNG exports. In theory, this could spark a price war between the United States and Russia where the
two rivals try to compete for European gas imports. Pitting Russia against the United States in a race to
profit from gas exports to the EU is completely within the realm of Germany’s power, because the two
rival powers need Germany as a strategic ally.
If the Germans succeed in the construction of Nord Stream 2, the EU will move closer to
becoming a truly German-dominated bloc. In the wake of Brexit, the key political advocate of the
United States no longer has a say in internal EU affairs, further supporting the case for a strengthened
and unified coalition of European countries with the capacity to stand alone in matters of security and
foreign policy. Germany faces challenges in the CEE region however, namely an increasing Russian
sphere of influence, which makes the idea of EU solidarity more important than ever. Since Nord
Stream 2 does not coincide with this objective, Germany should spearhead the development of the SEM
to guarantee energy security for its eastern cohorts. On the Russia front, a somewhat deepened
partnership with the Kremlin will only serve Germany’s diplomatic ambitions in solving the Ukraine
crisis. Russia cannot threaten the energy security of Europe while being in the headlock of a Germandominated, cohesive European Union, and Berlin should exploit this. In addition, German flirtations
with Russia will be contributing to the European Union’s geopolitical benefit by balancing the power
between Moscow and Washington. By playing the two actors off of each other, Germany can position
the European Union in the center of a race between two great powers vying for influence in a pivotal
region, and use this favorable dynamic to profit on reduced energy prices from both countries. With
Nord Stream 2, Germany could become a global powerhouse with its economy serving as the
cornerstone to a unified European Union.
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3.2 Russia’s Master Plan
Russia’s geopolitical position on Nord Stream 2 is obvious: fortify its EU market share with
Nord Stream 2, maintain credibility as a reliable supplier of gas, deepen relations with an increasingly
nationalist Germany, and use its geopolitical clout to stifle US primacy in the European Union. A
geoeconomic strategy for Russia to achieve its goals and cover space on the European energy
chessboard is to continue to deepen its ties with the CEE countries Hungary and the Czech Republic,
who will be loyal consumers of Russian gas without the potential for importing LNG. Creating
economic ties with these countries will also serve to further Russia’s geopolitical interests by increasing
the number of pro-Russian voices in the European Union. Once US LNG exports start to penetrate
Europe, Russia will want to have a grip on as many EU consumers as it can in order to keep its gas
flowing through the internal market in large quantities at affordable costs. This will make it difficult for
private energy companies in the United States to compete with cheap pipeline gas prices, and they might
turn to focus on Asian-Pacific markets instead. Keeping its options open, Russia should also make an
eastern pivot to Asia and hasten the construction of its pipeline infrastructure to Chinese and other
lucrative Asian energy consumers. In case Nord Stream 2 falls through, Russia will need another market
to fall back on while the European Union simultaneously searches for a diversified source of supply.
It is absolutely essential that Russia treads very carefully and refrains from angering EU member
states by punishing them with reduced gas flows, like its actions against Poland in the OPAL line.
Russia does not have political capital to spare in the European Union and each aggressive foreign policy
measure against the interests of the EU will place increased stress on Germany trying to bridge Europe
to the Russian natural gas reserves. A close relationship with Germany would be invaluable for the
interests of Russia on multiple levels. With the German economy as a stable, loyal customer for
Gazprom, Russia can develop this relationship in pursuit of its grand scheme to become the fuel source
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to two of the world’s most dynamic economies in China and Russia. If Nord Stream 2 succeeds, Russia
should make efforts to cease conflict with Ukraine in order to begin a cooperative alliance with the
leader of the European Union, as the country would lose geopolitical relevance.

3.3 The United States’ Shift in Strategy
Brzezinski eloquently sums up the US position, “the issue of how a globally engaged America
copes with the complex Eurasian power relationships- and particularly whether it prevents the
emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power- remains central to America’s capacity to
exercise global primacy.”69 Thus, the United States must take on a more nuanced approach of dealing
with Russia that involves close collaboration with its European allies. This implies that the United
States needs to stop unilaterally targeting Russia’s infrastructural projects with Europe, including Nord
Stream 2. Rather than targeting Russian-EU energy operations, the United States needs to lobby for
investment in increased LNG infrastructure in European countries to facilitate future trans-Atlantic
energy trade. This means reaching out to countries on the coast of Europe, with conducive geographical
settings similar to Lithuania, Croatia and Poland, the three main investors in LNG infrastructure. The
United States should strongly support the Three Seas Initiative and form domestic policies that facilitate
energy trade with coastal European countries, going so far as considering an export subsidy on LNG to
Europe. European countries that could be potential investors in LNG infrastructure in southern Europe
could be Italy and Greece, who currently have four and one existing terminal, respectively. Both are
situated on the southern side of Europe, opposite of Nord Stream 2’s starting flow. On the eastern side
of Europe, Bulgaria and Romania have coasts on the Black Sea where LNG infrastructure could be
established. The United States must race Russia to lobby these southern European countries to build

69

Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, xiv

Wilson, David E. 39
LNG terminals before the TurkStream pipeline is constructed and operational. Most importantly, the
United States should persuade Germany to invest in LNG infrastructure on its northern coast in order to
get a slice of the key gas distributing country in Europe. In addition, a core strategy voiced by
Brzezinski in the 1990s for the United States in Europe to counter Russian influence still stands true: to
incessantly promote EU integration and continue to voice support for sustaining the NATO security
alliance. A united and strong European Union could potentially pose a rivalry to US power, but it would
be instrumental in avoiding a Eurasian coalition of power between Germany and Russia. NATO is
significant both in maintaining US influence from across the Atlantic and fixing the conflict in Ukraine,
a geopolitical focal point on the European landscape. The future of NATO is at jeopardy with European
countries feeling more used than supported following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is
imperative for the United States to diplomatically maintain the security dimension to trans-Atlantic
relations in order to contain an aggressive Russia. The United States failing to see the value in
sustaining this security relationship with Europe would be a major strategic blunder for the White House
and would severely erode US primacy in Eurasia.

3.4 A Cohesive European Union
In the contemporary energy security paradigm, markets use regulation as a geoeconomic tool to
force suppliers to play within a structure of laws and principles that benefits the consumers. This legal
weapon is the key to the European Union’s maximization of benefits from the Russia-US clash over the
EU market. Gazprom will hire and dispatch more lobbyists to sway the European Commission’s
perspective in favor of Nord Stream 2, while the United States will attempt to politically back the
pipeline’s opponents to bring the project to a halt. In the bombardment of geoeconomic tools coming
from the east and the west, the European Commission must remain steadfast in selecting the best option
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for the entirety of the Union. From this evidence presented in this paper, that would encourage the
Commission to give the green light on the Nord Stream 2, vastly increasing Europe’s supply of Russian
gas. To prevent a monopoly, the Commission was right to engage Gazprom in an anti-trust investigation
in 2012, which lead to the raid of offices in ten EU member states amid concerns of their contractual
relations with the Russian energy giant.70 If the EU finds Gazprom in breach of its legislation, the
company would face enormous fines of nearly 10 percent of its annual turnover.71 If the European
Union takes on Russia in energy relations, it must be prepared to stringently regulate Gazprom’s
behavior, and aggressively constrain the ability of not just Russian, but all foreign exporters to find
loopholes in the SEM.
The other priority for the European Union must be to commit to diversifying import options from
various suppliers across the globe. It would be a grave mistake for the European Union to feel
disincentivized with the addition of Nord Stream 2 and rely on its chokehold on Russian gas reserves for
an extended period of time. This is a valid concern of Eastern European opponents of the Nord Stream
2, fearing that such a bountiful supply of cheap gas would create a sense of complacency within Western
Europe. Surely, the European Union will invest heavily in renewable energy sources, with the Paris
Accord motivating almost every nation on the planet to prioritize environmental impact when choosing
its preferred energy source. But while gas becomes the transition fuel defining the next half century,
Europe must invest not only in renewable, but LNG infrastructure with the predicted boom in LNG
export capacity around the corner. Not only will this provide Europe with a safety net against Gazprom
imports, but it will further invigorate the profitable Russia-US geoeconomic export rivalry, and
potentially add to the game other suppliers of gas that would further increase competition in the SEM.
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Thus, the primary objective for the European Union is to set aside national interests, coalesce into a
singular decision-making body, and craft policies that benefit the Union as a whole.

Conclusion
For a multitude of reasons, the European landscape has retained its geopolitical significance
since the end of the Cold War, just as Brzezinkski postulated. The three “geostrategic players” active on
the European chessboard, Russia, Germany, and the United States, are currently engaged in a
geoeconomic contest to secure commercial profit driven by an oversupply of natural resources. One can
picture this situation as an energy-themed game of geopolitical chess, where Russia aims to put the
United States in check with the construction of Nord Stream 2, Russia’s ‘rook’ in the Northern Corridor
of gas transit. Nord Stream 2 represents the most recent major collaborative strike engineered by
Germany and Russia to accrue both geopolitical and geoeconomic standing in the playing field,
undermining the objectives of the United States. The construction of Nord Stream 2, in sum, will
elevate Germany’s geopolitical and economic status as the EU champion, allow Russia to bypass a
tumultuous and costly Ukrainian transit route while securing its share of the remunerative EU energy
market, but hinder US aspirations to become a major supplier of LNG to the European Union.
Future geopolitical analyses in the realm of energy security in the European Union would benefit
from avoiding focusing on trivial political details and instead painting a portrait of the geopolitical
Eurasian arena where geostrategic actors have collided since the genesis of the new international order.
This study would welcome a parallel analysis of Russia’s other rook, the developing TurkStream
pipeline in the Southern Corridor of Europe, with the assessment of Turkey as a new geostrategic actor
vying for influence in the EU energy market. As the Nord Stream 2 discourse continues, updated
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analyses of actions with geopolitical implications would continue to shed light on the possible
geostrategic interests of the aforementioned political actors.
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